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EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY-EXTENT TO WHICH JUROR'S .AFFIDAVIT MAY 
BE UsED TO IMPEACH VERDICT-Defendant was convicted of murder in 
the first degree and made a motion for a new trial on the basis of a juror's 
affidavit which asserted that the jury had been divided eight to four in 
favor of life imprisonment over the death sentence, that subsequently 
several jurors introduced into the deliberations the fact that the defendant 
had been charged, in another indictment, with assault with intent to 
kill, that this became a part of the jury's deliberation, and that, as a 
result, the jury did not recommend life imprisonment and, instead, the 
death sentence was imposed. On appeal, held, motion for new trial 
granted, three justices dissenting. The affidavit was not admissible to 
show the effect of the jury's misconduct, but was admissible to show 
the existence of misconduct. The existence of such misconduct was 
sufficient grounds for granting the motion. State v. Kociolek, (N.J. 1955) 
ll8 A. (2d) 812. 
In attempting to formulate rules regarding the admissibility of affi-
davits to impeach jury verdicts, many distinctions have been drawn.1 These 
have been necessary to avoid the harsh consequences of the general rule 
1 See, generally, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§2349-2353 (1940); McCORI\UCK, EVI-
DENCE §68 (1954); 47 MICH. L. REv. 261 (1948); 10 OHIO ST. L. J. 262 (1949). 
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that a juror's affidavit may not be used to impeach the verdict.2 The affi-
davit has been held admissible where the alleged misconduct occurred out-
side the jury room,3 where the misconduct was that of a person other than 
a juror,4 where the affidavit is in support of the verdict rendered,5 where it 
relates to overt acts and not to either the reasoning process by which the 
verdict is reached or matters that inhere in the verdict, 6 and where it is not 
used to sh~w the effect of the misconduct upon the verdict.7 There has not 
been unanimity of judicial opinion as to what fact situations fit within 
these rules.8 Policy considerations have weighed heavily in shaping the 
rules.9 It has been suggested that the admission of such affidavits will en-
courage vacillation by the jurors, post-verdict tampering by the parties 
and their counsel,10 and the undermining of the finality of the ver-
dict.11 Opposed to these factors is the consideration that the jurors are 
often the only persons who can tell of misconduct which may have influ-
enced the verdict and that by suppressing this information the court fails to 
do justice in the case involved.12 The adoption of the view followed by 
the court in the principal case, which permits affidavits to show the exist-
ence of overt misconduct (i.e., misconduct evidenced by words or actions), 
makes it possible to satisfy substantially all of the above policy considera-
tions. This view does not make judgments as final as they would be if 
jurors' affidavits were not permitted at all, but such finality is neither 
2 The rule was laid down in Vaise v. Delaval, l T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (1785). 
Although subject to much criticism, it has received widespread acceptance in the United 
States. See, e.g.: People v. Tomczak, 250 Mich. 679, 231 N.W. 63 (1930); Chicago Sanitary 
Dist. v. Cullerton, 147 Ill. 385, 35 N.E. 723 (1893). . 
3See Capozzi v. Butterwei, 2 N.J. Super. 593, 65 A. (2d) 884 (1949), where a visit 
by a juror to the scene of the accident was sufficient to overturn the verdict. 
4 State v. Adams, 141 Ohio St. 423, 48 N.E. (2d) 861 (1943); 146 A.L.R. 514 (1943); 
Wilkins v. Abbey, 168 Misc. 416, 5 N.Y.S. (2d) 826 (1938); Emmert v. State, 127 Ohio 
St. 235, 187 N.E. 862 (1933); 90 A.L.R. 249 (1934). 
5 State v. James, 198 Iowa 976, 200 N.W. 577 (1924). Contra, State v. Lindeman, 64 
N.D. 518, 254 N.W. 276 (1934); 93 A.L.R. 1449 (1934). 
6 It is upon this distinction that the greatest deviation from the general rule has 
occurred. Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539 (1874); Wright v. Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195 
(1866); Miami v. Bopp, 117 Fla. 532, 158 S. 89 (1934); 97 A.L.R. 1038 (1935). A distinc-
tion along these lines is also incorporated in the MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, rule 301 (1942), 
and in the UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, rules 7, 41, 44 (1953). 
7 State v. McChesney, 114 Wash. 113, 194 P. 551 (1921); Taylor v. State, 18 Ala. App. 
466, 93 S. 78 (1922). A question may also arise as to whether the jurors have a privilege 
as to their statements and acts within the jury room. This is independent of the admis-
sibility question and is beyond the scope of this note. See, generally, 8 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE, 3d ed., §2346 (1940); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 53 S.Ct. 465 (1933), noted 
in 31 MICH. L. REV. 857 (1933). 
s Compare Miami v. Bopp, note 6 supra, with State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 103 P. 
420 (1909). 
9 The policy rationale of Vaise v. Delaval, note 2 supra, was that the jurors should 
not stultify themselves. In that case, Lord Mansfield thought it permissible for third 
parties to report on misconduct in the jury room even though this same misconduct 
could not be revealed by a juror's affidavit. 
10 See People v. Pizzino, 313 Mich. 97, 20 N.W. (2d) 824 (1945). 
11 See Caldwell v. F. E. Spears &: Sons, 186 Ky. 64, 216 S.W. 83 (1919). 
12 Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 13 S.Ct. 50 (1892); Perry v. Bailey, note 6 
supra; State v. McCormick, 57 Kan. 440, 46 P. 777 (1896). 
1956] RECENT DECISIONS 1005 
necessary nor desirable. Where the affidavit alleges overt misconduct 
which may have· influenced the finding, excluding it achieves stability, 
but only at the expense of doing justice between the parties.13 Admitting 
affidavits to show overt acts does not encourage post-verdict tampering or 
fraud since the affidavit relates to matters of sight and hearing and can be 
checked against the observations of the other jurors. Thus, post-verdict 
tampering would be successful only if the entire jury had been influenced. 
As suggested in the principal case, the test of the jurors' affidavits should 
be whether the subject of the affidavit is independently verifiable. This 
test can and should be applied to every kind of juror's affidavit, thereby 
cutting away the many rules and distinctions which now clutter the area. 
Unfortunately, the principal case itself makes an unnecessary distinction 
between using the affidavit to show misconduct and using it to show the 
effect of such miscOJ!.duct. It is true that an affidavit showing the effect of 
misconduct on a particular juror will often be subjective and not inde-
pendently verifiable.14 But if it is independently verifiable, the fact that 
the affidavit goes to the effect of misconduct or to the juror's reasoning pro-
cess should not require its exclusion.15 Thus, an affidavit based upon veri-
fiable evidence indicating that, prior to the misconduct, the jurors were in 
favor of a result different from the one reached should be received.16 Of 
course the court will have the final task of determining the actual effect of 
any misconduct on the jury's deliberations.17 In some cases it is possible 
for the court to find, as in the principal case,18 that the misconduct could 
have influenced the verdict and to grant a new trial without the aid of any 
affidavit on the effect of the misconduct. But in cases where there is greater 
doubt as to the effect of the misconduct on the jury, the court should be 
able to make a more intelligent finding on this point with the knowledge of 
independently verifiable facts which can be uncovered only by the aid of a 
13 To argue against this is similar to saying that a new trial should not be given 
where new evidence reveals that a principal witness was lying about a material issue, 
since this would destroy the "finality of the verdict." 
14 This is so where the juror attempts to explain what influence the misconduct has 
had upon his mind. The juror's affidavit in the principal case may have been of a sub-
jective nature in regard to the effect of misconduct on the verdict. But affidavits relating 
to reasoning and the effect of misconduct will not necessarily be subjective. See notes 
15 and 16 infra. 
15 Reaching a verdict by a game of chance or by averaging (quotient verdict) may 
be a part of the jury's reasoning process. But this should be the proper subject of a 
juror's affidavit since it is independently verifiable. But see Hoffman v. St. Paul, 187 
Minn. 320, 245 N.W. 373 (1932); McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783 (1915); 
52 A.L.R. 74 (1928). 
16 Verifiable evidence in this situation would include a poll taken from the jurors 
prior to the alleged misconduct. It would not include post-verdict affidavits by the jurors 
stating that they had changed their minds due to the misconduct. As to an affidavit by 
a juror reporting another juror's expressions prior to the misconduct to show that the 
other juror had changed his mind, this would be independently verifiable evidence. 
However, in this situation there is the additional question of privilege for a juror's 
statements in the jury room which might justify the exclusion of such an affidavit. 
17 The court would not necessarily be bound by the juror's affidavit in making this 
decision. 
1s Principal case at 818-819. 
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juror's affidavit. The result reached in the principal case is a desirable one, 
and a test of admissibility based upon a distinction between misconduct 
which is evidenced by overt acts which are independently verifiable and that 
which is not is a sensible solution to the competing policy factors in the area 
of jurors' affidavits. The problem now remains to clear away the unneces-
sary distinction between misconduct and the effect of misconduct, thereby 
leaving only one test to be applied. 
Herbert R. Brown, S. Ed. 
